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The State Secrets Privilege:
What's Wrong With It, How It Got That Way,
and How the Courts Can Fix It
by CHRISTOPHER D. YAMAOKA*
"What ought to be done under such circumstances present[s] a delicate
question, the discussion of which, it is hoped, will never be rendered
necessary in this country."
Chief Justice John Marshall1
I. Introduction
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule that
allows for evidence to be protected from discovery where its disclosure
would threaten national security.2 It is a powerful privilege; once invoked,
it often leads to dismissal of the case.3 Formerly a rare tactic, the privilege
has been invoked with increasing frequency by the George W. Bush
administration in litigation challenging its tactics in its war on terror.4
Courts have sustained the government's assertions of the state secrets
privilege with such remarkable consistency that when Chief Judge Vaughn
Walker of the Northern District of California actually rejected the privilege
J.D. Candidate 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2004,
Economics, Amherst College. The author currently lives in San Francisco, but is a lifelong
Dodgers fan. He would like to thank Ben Nivison, Professor Ash Bhagwat, and the Quarterly's
hardworking editorial staff.
1. States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692d).
2. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
3. For example, if the plaintiffs cannot make out the prima facie case without the protected
evidence. See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998).
4. The privilege was invoked six times between 1953 and 1976. Since 2001, it has been
invoked a reported 22 times. See PATRICE MCDERMOTT & EMILY FELDMAN,
OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, SECRECY REPORT CARD 2006: INDICATORS OF SECRECY IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2006), http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2006.pdf see also
Scott Shane, Invoking Secrets Privilege Becomes a More Popular Legal Tactic by U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2006.
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during the summer of 2006, it was viewed as a "rare act of constitutional
independence."5 In the opinion, Chief Judge Walker stated:
[I]t is important to note that even the state secrets privilege has
its limits. While the court recognizes the executive's
constitutional duty to protect the nation from threats, the court
takes seriously its constitutional duty to adjudicate the disputes
that come before it .... To defer to a blanket assertion of secrecy
here would be to abdicate that duty.... 6
What Chief Judge Walker articulated is that the state secrets privilege
has so expanded in scope and in power that it legitimately may be asked
whether a court carries out its constitutional duty when it applies the
privilege in its current form. It is the goal of this note to explore that
question.
To define the judiciary's constitutional duty is a topic all its own, but
one worth discussing briefly at the outset. The Constitution itself suggests
the judiciary is to adjudicate the cases and controversies that come before
it, but that proposition comes in the form of a grant of power, rather than an
explicit command.7 A more specific directive comes from the Supreme
Court itself, in Marbury v. Madison: "The very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection."8  This note contends that the
judiciary-by increasing (1) the power of the privilege to get cases
dismissed and (2) the degree of deference given to assertions of the
privilege-now fails to carry out the judicial duty defined in Marbury when
applying the state secrets privilege. Accordingly, this note analyzes two
judicial missteps.
First, courts have become increasingly likely to use the state secrets
privilege to dismiss litigation before the merits.9 By definition, dismissal
before the merits denies an individual the protection of the laws; improper
dismissal, then, is constitutionally problematic. Second, courts have
granted too much deference to executive assertions of the privilege.10 The
5. Nat Hentoff, An Expansive View of 'State Secrets', WASH. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at
A15.
6. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
9. See discussion infra Part 11.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Supreme Court has crafted a flawed approach to dealing with the privilege,
and lower courts have extended even greater deference in applying that
approach. The resulting lack of judicial scrutiny means a privilege prone to
abuse.
In these two ways-taking the government at its word and giving the
privilege fatal effect-a court fails to carry out its constitutional duty when
it applies the current approach to claims of the state secrets privilege. This
note seeks to explain where and how these problems came about and to
suggest an alternative approach to assertions of the privilege. Tracing the
evolution of the doctrine is critical to understanding where and how it has
come to be overgrown. Accordingly, Part II lays out a brief history of the
state secrets privilege in American jurisprudence. Part III examines the
problem of increasing use of the privilege to dismiss litigation before the
merits. Part IV focuses on the problem of judicial deference, first
illustrating that the existing approach is problematic, then explaining how it
came to be that way, and finally presenting an alternative approach. Part V
concludes.
II. A Brief History
A. The Roots of the Privilege
The privilege finds its earliest American roots in Aaron Burr's trial for
treason. 1 In that case, Burr moved to subpoena a letter by General James
Wilkinson.' 2  The government argued that the letter contained "matter
which ought not to be disclosed."'13 Chief Justice Marshall foresaw what
would come to be central to future debates over assertions of the state
secrets privilege: that a litigant's need for certain information essential to
his or her case would collide with the government's need to protect that
information, the disclosure of which would "endanger the public safety."'
14
Marshall decided that Burr's case did not present such a dilemma, as there
was no indication that the letter contained information so dangerous, but
noted that "what ought to be done under such circumstances present[s] a
delicate question, the discussion of which, it is hoped, will never be
rendered necessary in this country."' 5  Unfortunately, resolution of
Marshall's delicate question would become entirely necessary.
11. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
12. States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692d).
13. Id. at 37.
14. Id.
15. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.
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B. Totten v. United States: A Precursor
In Totten v. United States, the Supreme Court established a rule that
would become a precursor to the state secrets privilege and moreover,
important to the expansion of the power of the privilege.1 6 In Totten, the
plaintiff sued to enforce an alleged contract between the government and
the plaintiff's intestate, a former spy. 7 The Court held that the secrecy of
the contract precluded any action for its enforcement.1 8 It reasoned that if
such an action could be brought, the proceeding would necessarily lead to
disclosure of the details and mechanics of a clandestine operation, and that
such exposure could be to the "serious detriment of the public."19 Thus,
Totten established a rule precluding judicial review of cases "where success
depends on the existence of [a] secret espionage relationship with the
Government. 2 °
Totten plays a key role in the story of the state secrets privilege. Not
only is it a precursor to the privilege, it has also occasionally been confused
with or muddled into the privilege.21 It has been employed in cases where,
arguably, a state secrets analysis should have been used instead. 2
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's principal state secrets case contains a
confusing citation to Totten, which courts have misread with
constitutionally significant ramifications. This issue is discussed in Part
III.
C. United States v. Reynolds: The Modern Doctrine
The Supreme Court first articulated the modem state secrets doctrine
in United States v. Reynolds.24 In Reynolds, the plaintiffs sued the
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act after a B-29 military aircraft
crashed and killed their civilian husbands.2 ' They sought discovery of the
Air Force's official accident investigation report.2 6  The government
16. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
17. Id. at 105.
18. Id. at 107.
19. Id. at 106-07.
20. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005).
21. See id. ("[T]he Court of Appeals also claimed that Totten has been recast simply as an
early expression of the evidentiary 'state secrets' privilege, rather than a categorical bar to their
claims.").
22. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
23. See discussion infra Part III.B.
24. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
25. Id. at 2-3.
26. Id. at 3.
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objected to production of the report, explaining that the plane was engaged
in a "highly secret mission. 2 7 The Secretary of the Air Force filed a
formal "Claim of Privilege" and the government submitted the affidavit of
the Judge Advocate General, which claimed that the report "could not be
furnished 'without seriously hampering national security, flying safety and
the development of highly technical and secret military equipment."' 28 The
court sought to review the report in camera to determine whether it indeed
contained information that should not be disclosed.2 9  The government
refused.3° Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3' the court
ordered that the issue of negligence be taken as established in the plaintiffs'
favor.32 Final judgment was entered for the plaintiffs and the Third Circuit
affirmed.3 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the question
of the government's privilege to resist discovery.34
The Court wrote that when the Secretary of the Air Force filed his
Claim of Privilege, he was attempting "to invoke the privilege against
revealing military secrets, a privilege which is well established in the law
of evidence." 35 After defining the requirements for claiming the privilege,
the Court set out the challenge that faced trial courts: "The court itself must
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.,
36
The Reynolds Court was faced with a challenge of its own: crafting a
rule that would allow lower courts to carry out this balancing act. Noting
the lack of judicial experience with this new privilege, the Court turned to
the privilege against self-incrimination, which it deemed analogous. 37 In
dealing with that privilege, courts had rejected the two extreme positions:
that the witness' assertion should be taken as conclusive and that the
witness should be required to reveal the basis of his claim to the judge for
verification.38 Instead, courts had developed a compromise, under which
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 4-5.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
32. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 6-7.
36. Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 8.
38. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9.
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the court would accept the claim of privilege if it were "satisfied from all
the evidence and circumstances, and 'from the implications of the question,
in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question
or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.'
39
Thus, the Reynolds Court defined the modem approach for dealing
with assertions of the state secrets privilege by analogy. Under this
approach, a judge may not require disclosure of the evidence-even ex
parte and in camera-in all cases. 40 Importantly, however, Reynolds does
not foreclose the possibility of review. For non-disclosure to be
appropriate, the judge must be convinced from all other evidence and
circumstances "that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged. '41 Moreover, where the plaintiffs show a
greater necessity for the evidence, the court should be more demanding in
42satisfying itself that invocation of the privilege was appropriate.
Applying its newly formulated approach, the Reynolds Court sustained the
government's claim of privilege.43
III. The First Problem: Courts Have Been Too Quick to Dismiss
Litigation Before the Merits
In the area of state secrets cases, courts have become increasingly
likely to dismiss litigation before the merits.44 They have done this in two
ways. First, they have expanded Totten to apply to a wider range of
cases--cases that otherwise could be handled under the state secrets
privilege.45 While the state secrets privilege affords some procedure,
Totten is an absolute bar to suit; when it is invoked, the case is dismissed.46
Second, they have misread Reynolds' citation to Totten.47 The product of
39. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)).
40. See id. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 10-12.
44. See Erin M. Stilp, The Military and State-Secrets Privilege: The Quietly Expanding
Power, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 831, 839 n.74-75 (2006) (citing, by way of example, eighteen cases
dismissed at the pleadings stage between 1988 and 2006, but ten cases from 1958 to 1984 in
which the litigation was allowed to continue after upholding of the privilege).
45. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 146-47 (1981)
(dismissing the case on the grounds that the question whether the Navy had complied with the
National Environmental Policy Act was beyond judicial scrutiny, citing Totten).
46. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
47. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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this misreading is a state secrets privilege which more often leads to
outright dismissal.48 Improper dismissal of litigation before the merits
threatens Marbury's "very essence of civil liberty. '49 Accordingly, any
tendency to do so should be examined carefully.
A. Expanding Totten
Totten originally stood for the proposition that a plaintiff could not
bring suit against the government based on a secret espionage agreement.5°
The imposition of such an outright bar was justified by the fact that the
case centered on a contract that had itself been secret. 5 The bilateral
acknowledgement of secrecy in entering into the contract was the critical
underpinning of the Totten Court's decision that no action could be
founded upon it.
52
However, the end of the opinion contains dictum which has since been
used to expand the application of Totten to a range of cases beyond those
which center on secret contracts: In concluding, the Totten Court wrote,
"[i]t may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential. ' '53 Based on this language, courts have expanded the scope of
Totten's application, using it to defeat otherwise valid claims in a number
of areas of law.54
48. Id.
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). As Chief Judge Walker stated, "The
compromise between liberty and security remains a difficult one. But dismissing this case at the
outset would sacrifice liberty for no apparent enhancement of security." Hepting, 439 F. Supp.
2d at 995.
50. Totten, 92 U.S. at 105. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005).
51. Totten, 92 U.S. at 106 ("Our objection is not to the contract, but to the action upon it...
The service stipulated by the contract was a secret service ... Both employer and agent must
have understood that the lips of the other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of
either to the matter.").
52. Id.
53. Id. at 107.
54. See Sean C. Flynn, The Totten Doctrine and Its Poisoned Progeny, 25 VT. L. REv. 793,
794 (2001) ("In recent years, courts have used Totten to defeat otherwise valid claims under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act... and the National Environmental Policy Act.").
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B. By Misreading Reynolds' Citation to Totten, Courts Have Improperly
Increased the Power of the State Secrets Privilege to Dismiss
Litigation before the Merits
Even more troubling than the courts' application of Totten to a
widening range of cases has been their increasing tendency to lend the state
secrets privilege the Tottenesque ability to dismiss litigation on the
pleadings.5 5 The Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished between "the
categorical Totten bar [and] the balancing of the state secrets evidentiary
privilege. 56 However, due to the thematic relationship between the two
doctrines and Reynolds' confusing citation to Totten, courts have
improperly employed the state secrets privilege to dismiss litigation before
the merits.57 Kasza v. Browner, a Ninth Circuit case from 1998, serves as
58an illustration.
In Kasza, the plaintiffs alleged that the Air Force had violated the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act by improperly storing, treating,
and disposing of hazardous waste. 59 The government refused to provide
almost all of the information requested in discovery, invoking the state
secrets privilege. 60 Based on a declaration of the Air Force Vice Chief of
Staff, the trial court accepted the claim of privilege and granted summary
judgment in favor of the government.6'
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that application of the state secrets
privilege can have three effects. 62  First, the evidence covered by the
privilege is removed from the case; if the plaintiff can no longer prove the
prima facie claim without the privileged evidence, the case will be
dismissed.63 Second, if removal of certain evidence by the privilege
deprives the defendant of an otherwise available defense, the court may
grant summary judgment for the defendant.64 Third, "if the 'very subject
matter of the action' is a state secret, then the court should dismiss the
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
56. Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9-10.
57. See, e.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing the case
prior to discovery because the "very subject matter" of the action was deemed a state secret);
Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing the case
prior to discovery based on the Attorney General's invocation of the state secrets privilege).
58. Kasza, 133 F.3d at t 159.
59. Id. at 1163.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1166.
63. Id.
64. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166.
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plaintiffs action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets
privilege. 65 This third option is cause for particular concern. If a court
finds the "very subject matter" of a litigation to be a state secret, the case is
dismissed outright.66 It is of tremendous import, then, considering the due
process implications of dismissal before the merits, what exactly "very
subject matter" is taken to mean. A closer look reveals that the "very
subject matter" language, which was taken from Reynolds, has been
misinterpreted and applied too broadly.67 This third category should
encompass only a narrow range of cases, exemplified by Totten.
The Kasza court wrote that outright dismissal of the suit was proper
because "[a]s the very subject matter of [the plaintiffs] action is a state
secret, we need not reach her other arguments regarding invocation of the
privilege. 68 The "very subject matter" language comes from a footnote in
Reynolds.69 In that section of Reynolds, the Court explains that in state
secrets analysis, a stronger showing of necessity for the evidence by the
plaintiff calls for a more aggressive inquiry by the court. 70 However, at the
extreme, "even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim
of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at
stake., 71 As an illustration of such an extreme situation, the Court cites
Totten.72 The footnote reads: "See [Totten] where the very subject matter
of the action, a contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret.
The action was dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the
question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the action should never
prevail over the privilege.,
73
In other words, Reynolds says that, in extreme cases, the privilege may
trump even the strongest need for the evidence by the plaintiff.74 But
Reynolds does not say that any case involving something the government
considers confidential may be dismissed on the pleadings. The confusion
stems from the court's use of the phrase "very subject matter," which at
first blush, may seem to apply to cases "involving" or "about" something of
a secret nature. But in Reynolds, "very subject matter" is used to describe
65. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26).
66. Id.
67. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953).
68. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170.
69. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 11 n.26.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 11.
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the alleged spy contract that formed the entire basis of the suit in Totten.75
Dismissal on the pleadings was justified in Totten only because it was
entirely "obvious" that the action could never prevail.76 But, examining
Totten, it was only obvious that action could never prevail because the
entire action hinged on the existence of a secret contract.77 To try the case
would have necessarily meant disclosure of that secret contract. 78 Thus, it
was "obvious" the action could never prevail. 79 By comparison, the action
in Kasza did not rest entirely on the existence of something secret; it
merely involved secret evidence.8° So it was not entirely obvious, as it was
in Totten, that the action was unsustainable. Kasza is not analogous to
Totten, and dismissal on the pleadings is not justified under Reynolds.
To summarize: Reynolds says that dismissal on the pleadings may be
justified in extreme cases, where it is obvious the action can never
prevail.81 It is obvious an action can never prevail where, as in Totten, the
entire action is built upon the existence of something that cannot be
disclosed, such as an espionage contract. Unfortunately, perhaps because
the phrase "very subject matter" may seem to encompass cases "involving"
or "thematically about"-as distinguished from built-upon-secret
evidence, courts have been too apt to dismiss litigation on the pleadings.
Moreover, Totten was distinct in that the due process concerns that
accompany outright dismissal based on a governmental claim of privilege
were alleviated by the bilateral acknowledgment of the secrecy of the
contract. The Totten Court held that no action could be founded on such a
contract because "[b]oth employer and agent must have understood that the
lips of the other were to be for ever [sic] sealed respecting the relation of
either to the matter., 83 In such a situation, where the plaintiff has entered
into an agreement that both he and the government considered secret, the
plaintiff had reason to know that he could never bring suit in a court of law
to enforce the contract. Accordingly, concern over depriving him of his
day in court is less troubling. Arguably then, considering the gravity of a
threat to "[t]he very essence of civil liberty, 84 courts should only employ
75. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26.
76. Id.
77. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875).
78. Id.
79. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26.
80. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1998).
81. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26.
82. Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
83. Id.
84. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S 137, 163 (1803).
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the drastic measure of outright dismissal where due process concerns are
similarly alleviated.
C. The "Very Subject Matter" Trigger for Dismissal Before the Merits
Should Be Read Narrowly
To the extent possible, courts should strive to make the operation of
the privilege consonant with the fundamental proposition that citizens shall
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.85 It
is entirely possible to do so, simply by limiting the "very subject matter"
trigger for dismissal to the narrow set of cases to which it was originally
meant to apply.
Courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in Kasza, have given liberal (and
erroneous) construction to the phrase "very subject matter., 86  A more
careful reading of Reynolds suggests that dismissal on the pleadings is
permissible only in the most extreme set of circumstances, exemplified by
Totten, where such a drastic measure is justified. There are two features of
Totten that justified dismissal before the merits. First, the case did not
simply involve a secret spy contract; it was an action to enforce that
87contract. Going to trial would have necessarily required its disclosure.
Only because the action was built upon secret evidence was it "obvious"
that the action could not prevail.88  Second, there was a bilateral
acknowledgment of secrecy upon entering into the alleged spy contract.89
This acknowledgment alleviates, at least to some extent, concerns over
depriving the plaintiff of the ability to sue over the contract. Where both
features are present-where there exist both an absolute need for the
evidence and some justification for denying the plaintiff the right to sue-
outright dismissal is justified. To restrict the ability of the privilege to
trigger dismissal on the pleadings to such circumstances is a narrow
reading of Reynolds, to be sure. But a narrow reading is entirely
appropriate where nothing short of a citizen's due process rights are at
stake.
As this discussion demonstrates, it is critical to distinguish the state
secrets privilege from the outright Totten bar. The distinction is critical
because, while Totten is an absolute bar to suit, the state secrets privilege
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. See discussion supra Part III.B.
87. See Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
88. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26.
89. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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affords the plaintiff at least some procedure.90  Accordingly, that
procedure-the approach employed by courts upon assertion of the
privilege-is of tremendous import. The following section scrutinizes that
approach.
IV. The Second Problem: Courts Have Been Too Deferential in
Handling Claims of the State Secrets Privilege
During the Jefferson Administration, Chief Justice Marshall
anticipated the dilemma that would face a court where a given piece of
evidence was both essential to the claim or defense of a litigant and
simultaneously so secret that its disclosure would "endanger the public
safety."91 Forty administrations later, the issue has been pushed to the
point of urgency: Chief Justice Marshall's "delicate question" 92 is the
essence of Chief Judge Walker's concern over the abdication of the
judiciary's constitutional duty.93 This section examines the way in which
courts have dealt with assertions of the privilege and whether they have
failed to fulfill their constitutional obligations in doing so.
While this section criticizes the extent to which courts have deferred
to governmental assertions of the privilege, it is not meant to trivialize the
importance of guarding closely those secrets whose revelation legitimately
would endanger public safety. Undoubtedly, there exist secrets of state
which categorically should not be revealed. This section simply asks: Does
there exist a judicial approach that would allow courts to determine when
such a situation exists?
A. A Flawed Approach
The Reynolds Court knew the challenge it faced. Introducing the state
secrets privilege, the Court cited Chief Justice Marshall's quote that "what
ought to be done ... presents a delicate question. 94  Answering that
question would require the Court to create a rule that would prevent
disclosure of information "which, in the interest of national security, should
not be divulged," yet at the same time, ensure that "[j]udicial control over
the evidence in a case [not] be abdicated to the caprice of executive
90. At a minimum, the court must decide whether the privilege applies. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
at 10.
91. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692d).
92. Id.
93. See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
94. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 n.18 (quoting Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37).
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officers., 95  With those dueling concerns in mind, the Court set out to
define an approach. Unfortunately, perhaps precisely because it sought to
serve two conflicting ends, it wrote a singularly confused opinion. In the
same breath, the Court announced that "the claim of privilege should not be
lightly accepted," but also that, "even the most compelling necessity cannot
overcome the privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military
secrets are at stake."9 6  The result of such a Jekyll and Hyde approach?
Lower courts, in applying the approach defined Reynolds, have come to all
but ignore the caution against the abandonment of judicial control.9 7
Instead, courts have too often read Reynolds as a command to "accept the
executive branch's claim of privilege without further demand.,
98
1. The Reynolds Approach, Defined
The Court sought to define an approach that would allow a court to
"determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect." 99  Acknowledging a lack of judicial
experience with the state secrets privilege, the Court modeled its rule on the
approach to claims of the privilege against self-incrimination.
00
Distilling a single "approach" from the Reynolds opinion is a
challenge, but a few things are clear:
(1) Examination of the evidence, even ex parte and in camera, is not
required in all cases.' 0
(2) The trial judge is to look at "all the circumstances of the case" to
determine whether "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged.'
0 2
95. Id. at 9-10.
96. Id. at 11.
97. A number of circuit courts, in upholding decisions to accept the privilege without
examination of the evidence, have cited the phrase, "utmost deference" in support of their
decision. See, e.g., Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1995); Zuckerbraun v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1994). This language is taken from dictum in
United States v. Nixon, a case about executive privilege, not state secrets. 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974).
98. EI-Masri v. United States, No. 06-1667, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4796, at *21 (4th Cir.
Mar. 2, 2007).
99. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 10.
102. Id.
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(3) The showing of necessity for the evidence made by the plaintiff
should determine the degree of scrutiny applied to the claim of privilege.
103
Thus, Reynolds stops short of giving the trial judge the ability to
examine the contested evidence in each case. Instead, the judge is pointed
toward the "circumstances of the case."'10 4  But since the state secrets
privilege is invoked at such an early stage of a litigation, those
circumstances are essentially limited to what has been plead, and what the
government has submitted in the form of affidavits. Thus, under Reynolds,
judges must often determine whether evidence should be removed from
trial by looking not at the evidence itself, but at what one party says the
evidence is. In short, there is no meaningful check on the veracity of the
government's assertion. For an illustration of the risks inherent in such an
approach, one need look no further than the story of United States v.
Reynolds itself.
2. The Problem with the Reynolds Approach, Illustrated
In the trial below, the district court ordered the government to produce
the Air Force's accident investigation report so it could determine, ex parte
and in camera, whether the report in fact contained privileged
information.10 5 The government refused, claiming the report "could not be
produced 'without seriously hampering national security, flying safety and
the development of highly technical and secret military equipment.'
10 6
Applying its newly defined standard, the Supreme Court ratified the
government's refusal to produce the report, finding that even ex parte in
camera review was not warranted.'17 The Court trusted that, even though
the trial judge had not been allowed to examine the report itself, the
affidavit of the executive official was sufficient proof that the report indeed
contained something that shouldn't be revealed in the interest of national
security.
When the accident report was declassified, it was revealed to contain
no secrets that would have threatened national security. 10 8 Instead, the
report showed that the crash was most likely caused by engine fire because
a protective shield designed to prevent engine overheating had not been
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 10.
108. Timothy Lynch, Op-Ed., An Injustice Wrapped in a Pretense; In '48 Crash, the US. Hid
Behind National Security, WASH. POST, June 22, 2003, at B3.
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installed. 0 9 In other words, the report contained not covert mission plans
or top secret aircraft designs, but plain evidence of negligence. The
Reynolds rule, intended to avoid surrender of judicial control to the caprice
of executive officers, 0 had allowed exactly that.
B. The Failures of the Reynolds Opinion
The story of Reynolds illustrates that the rule established in that case
fails to prevent executive abuse of the privilege. Moreover, courts have
since read Reynolds as requiring an even more deferential approach for
which it in fact called.1 1 What went wrong? In what way did the Reynolds
Court fail to accomplish its goal of answering Chief Justice Marshall's
delicate question? First, the Court attempted to define the approach to
analogizing the state secrets privilege to the privilege against self-
incrimination. But the two privileges are hardly analogous. The result is a
rule that fails to accomplish its intended goal of limiting executive control
of the litigation. Second, the Court wrote an opinion that would not, in
practice, effect the Court's intended compromise. The result has been far
greater judicial deference in the lower courts than was likely intended.
1. The Court Improperly Analogized the State Secrets Privilege to the
Privilege against Self-Incrimination
The Reynolds Court thought it had the solution to the challenge
presented by assertions of the new privilege. After all, the privilege against
self-incrimination had presented courts with a similar challenge: walking
the line between accepting the bare assertion of the witness as conclusive
on the one hand and requiring the witness to reveal the matter behind the
claim on the other. 112 So the Court drew an analogy, modeling the new
approach to claims of the state secrets privilege on the familiar approach to
claims of the privilege against self-incrimination. 1 3 Unfortunately, while
the two privileges present courts with similar challenges, the analogy is
improper for two reasons. First, the approach-which directs a court to
"look to the circumstances" in making its decision-assumes that there
exist circumstances upon which the judge can base a well-informed
decision. 1 4  But since the state secrets privilege is asserted before
discovery, there exist very limited "circumstances" for the judge to
109. Id.
110. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
111. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
112. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9.
113. Id. at8.
114. Id.
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examine. Second, compared to the consequences of accepting a claim of
the privilege against self-incrimination, the consequences of accepting a
claim of the state secrets privilege are much more dramatic.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself.'1 5 Under the privilege against
self-incrimination established pursuant to that provision, a witness may
refuse to answer a question where doing so would establish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute him. 16 However, the claim is not
accepted upon mere assertion; the court must be satisfied that an answer
would indeed result in a harmful disclosure.' 7 In Reynolds, the Court
stated its self-incrimination-inspired approach as follows: "[T]he court
must be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances, and 'from the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.""'
8
This approach works in the context of a claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination: if a witness on the stand claims that privilege, the judge
can look at the facts of the case and the question asked and make a well-
informed determination of whether an answer would likely be harmful.
But in the state secrets context, the question is whether disclosure would be
harmful to national security. And the only basis the judge has for making
that determination is what the government tells her. The approach assumes
circumstances that simply do not exist where the state secrets privilege is
invoked. In essence, trial judges are forced to take the government at its
word.
The second reason the analogy is improper is that the consequences of
accepting a claim of the state secrets privilege can be dramatic.1 9 The case
can be dismissed on the pleadings, and at the very least the plaintiff is
deprived of what is likely critical information. 12 0 By comparison, when the
privilege against self-incrimination is accepted, the witness does not
answer the question. This result is not trivial, but it is not nearly as
troubling as the sometimes fatal consequence of a state secrets claim.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
116. Hoffmnan v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
117. Id. at 486-87.
118. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87).
119. See discussion supra Part III.
120. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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2. The Reynolds Opinion Failed to Effect the Court's Intended Compromise
In drawing analogy to the privilege against self-incrimination, the
Reynolds Court purported to define a middle ground between the two
extremes of accepting the bare assertion of the government as conclusive
and requiring outright revelation of the basis for the claim.' 2' The Court
seemed to write a balancing test: "[T]he showing of necessity which is
made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that
the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate."'' 22 However, as
courts have applied Reynolds, the affidavit of a government official is
routinely accepted as conclusive, regardless of the strength of the plaintiff's
showing of necessity. 123 Why did this happen? While Reynolds purports to
adopt a compromise between the dueling concerns of giving too much
discretion on the one hand, and requiring a dangerous amount of disclosure
on the other, 124 it failed to give any teeth to the former concern. As a result,
Reynolds has come to represent something close to one of the extremes it
purported to reject.
Looking at the language of Reynolds, it is clear that the Court was
attempting to draft a compromise. 125 But while the opinion cautions courts
not to give too much discretion, it requires courts not to insist on complete
disclosure. 126 More specifically, the Court writes that "[j]udicial control
over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
officers," but immediately follows with, "[y]et we will not go so far as to
say that the court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the
judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case.' 2 7 At first
glance, the opinion appears to give something to plaintiffs' lawyers and
something to government lawyers--one for you and one for you. But the
plaintiffs get only an abstract caution while the government gets a rule: no
in camera review in every case. Similarly, as soon as the Court is finished
saying that "[w]here there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of
privilege should not be lightly accepted," it immediately says, "but even the
most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
121. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9.
122. Id. at 11.
123. See, e.g., Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 81 (D.D.C. 2004)
(dismissing the case prior to discovery based on the Attorney General's invocation of the state-
secrets privilege).
124. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
125. Id. at 9 ("Regardless of how it is articulated, some like formula of compromise must be
applied here.").
126. Id. at 9-10.
127. Id.
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court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." 128 Again,
plaintiffs get a caution flag to wave; the government gets a rule: the
privilege can defeat any showing of necessity if the court is satisfied.
As a result, courts applying Reynolds have, perhaps understandably,
paid more attention to the fact that Reynolds forbids them from insisting on
in camera review of the evidence in every case than the fact that it cautions
them not to surrender too much control. 129 Accordingly, courts have often
failed to take seriously Reynolds' instruction to demand more where the
plaintiffs need is strong. 130 Instead, courts often dismiss cases on the
pleadings after the state secrets privilege is claimed,' 31 often citing
Reynolds' statement that "even the most compelling necessity cannot
overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that
military secrets are at stake."'
132
To summarize: The Court failed to create a rule that would protect
both of the two conflicting concerns it sought to address. It failed by
drafting the rule by flawed analogy, and by writing an opinion that only
gave effect to one of those concerns. As a result, lower courts have
extended great deference to the government when faced with state secrets
claims. As Reynolds' postscript illustrates, such a deferential approach
carries a great risk of abuse. This picture signals the importance of some
sort of meaningful check on claims of the privilege. The remainder of this
section lays out an alternative approach that would provide such a check.
C. Courts Should Embrace Ex Parte In Camera Review as a Viable
Option
Foreshadowing what would become Chief Judge Walker's concern
some fifty-five years later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in its
Reynolds opinion wrote:
[T]o hold that the head of an executive department of the
Government in a suit to which the United States is a party may
conclusively determine the Government's claim of privilege is to
abdicate the judicial function and permit the executive branch of the
Government to infringe the independent province of the judiciary as
laid down by the Constitution. 133
128. Id. at 11.
129. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
131. See discussion supra Part III.
132. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
133. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951).
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Accordingly, the court thought the evidence should be examined ex parte
and in camera.
34
But the Supreme Court was not comfortable with a rule that would
allow in camera review in every case. 135 The Court believed they had an
approach that would work-that courts would be able to make informed
evidentiary rulings without looking at the evidence itself.' 36  Two
subsequent developments show that they were wrong. First, the recent
declassification of the accident report illustrates that the standard fails
adequately to guard against executive abuse of the privilege. 137  Second,
lower courts applying Reynolds have been extremely deferential, more
likely to take the government at its word and less likely to employ in
camera review.1
38
The approach should be changed. Courts should recognize-as did
the Third Circuit and Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson-that in
camera review is a viable option that would limit the risk of executive
abuse while maintaining the requisite level of secrecy. 1
39
1. Ex Parte In Camera Review Is Viable under Existing Supreme Court
Jurisprudence and Reynolds Itself
The Supreme Court has held that a trial court may review in camera
allegedly privileged evidence when making evidentiary rulings.
40
Moreover, the Court has specifically noted the value of in camera review as
a method of ensuring an appropriate balance between one party's claim of
privilege and the other party's asserted need for the evidence.'
4'
134. Id.
135. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 ("Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court may
automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be
accepted in any case.").
136. Id.
137. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
138. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
139. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951) ("[A] claim of privilege
against disclosing evidence relevant to the issues in a pending law suit involves a justiciable
question, traditionally within the competence of the courts .... "); United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (Black, Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
140. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 574 (1989) (holding that in camera review may be
used to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-client communications fall within the
crime-fraud exception).
141. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405 (1976) ("[I]n camera review of the
documents is a relatively costless and eminently worthwhile method to insure that the balance
between petitioners' claims of irrelevance and privilege and plaintiffs' asserted need for the
documents is correctly struck.").
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Furthermore, the Court has cited Reynolds itself for the proposition that the
Court "has long held the view that in camera review is a highly appropriate
and useful means of dealing with claims of governmental privilege. 142
Thus, in camera review is a viable approach under Reynolds and the
Court's jurisprudence on privilege in general.
In United States v. Zolin-in which the Court unanimously held in
camera review of allegedly privileged attorney-client communications to be
proper-the Court discussed Reynolds specifically. 143 The Zolin Court read
Reynolds as merely forbidding a per se rule that in camera review must be
conducted in every case.144 Yet, as discussed, it often evades courts that
Reynolds permits in camera review.145 Courts need simply remind
themselves that Reynolds does not forbid them to review allegedly
privileged evidence; indeed, the Supreme Court itself has read Reynolds as
an approval of in camera review. 
146
2. Ex Parte In Camera Review Is a Modest Proposal
Judicial deference to assertions of the state secrets privilege was so
consistent that when Chief Judge Walker dared to deny the claim, one
commentator wrote, "[i]f there is a future book of judges' profiles in
courage-and there should be-Judge Walker would be an inspirational
choice for inclusion." 147 Given such a landscape, it is worth noting that
calling for ex parte in camera review is a modest proposal-an approach
relatively accommodating to the government, particularly in comparison to
alternative methods.
For example, Congress has adopted the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA) to deal with claims by a criminal defendant that
privileged information is necessary for his or her defense.148 Under CIPA,
the court reviews the evidence in camera.1 49 If the court finds that the
evidence is indeed exculpatory, the government must choose between
142. Kerr, 426 U.S. at 405-06 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974);
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)).
143. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 570-71.
144. Id. at 571.
145. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
147. Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed., An Expansive View of 'State Secrets', WASH. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2006, at A 15.
148. See Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
745, 752 (1991).
149. Id.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 35:1
disclosing the information and dropping the case. 150 By comparison, in
camera review in the state secrets context would merely allow the judge to
determine the veracity of the claim; disclosure would never be the
consequence.
Alternatively, at least two authors and one district court have
suggested following proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509(e). 15' Rule
509(e) was the state secrets component of a proposal for determining
evidentiary privileges in federal courts that was never passed.
152
Essentially, this argument makes two assertions. First, Rule 501 directs
courts to determine privileges according to "the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience. 153
Second, a proposed rule-having been "developed by a representative
committee of bench, bar and scholars, twice published and commented on
by the bench and bar, adopted by the Judicial Conference and finally
forwarded by the Supreme Court to Congress"-is as close to an
embodiment of the light of reason and experience as one could find.'
5 4
Therefore, under Rule 501, judges should follow proposed Rule 509(e).
Rule 509(e) directs that if a state secrets claim is upheld, the judge may do
any of a number of things, including declaring a mistrial, finding against
the government upon the issue as to which the evidence is relevant, or
dismissing the action. 55 Thus, under this proposed alternative, which has
been applied by at least one district court, 156 acceptance of the privilege can
lead to a finding against the government. This was the same result reached
by the district court in Reynolds, suggesting that it is not out of line with
the common law pre-Reynolds.1
57
In comparison to these alternative proposals, simple in camera review
is favorable to the government. Indeed, one author has described use of in
camera review for verification of a privilege claim as "Creeping
150. Id.
151. Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Askin, supra note 148, at
769-72; Anthony Rapa, When Secrecy Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Department of Justice and
a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 233, 256 (2006).
152. Askin, supra note 148, at 770 (suggesting that the generic Rule 501 was passed after
disagreement over some of the privilege rules threatened forestallment of the entire package, but
noting that 509(e) was not one of the rules objected to by the Department of Justice, one of the
most vocal critics).
153. FED. R. EVID. 501.
154. Askin, supra note 148, at 771.
155. Askin, supra note 148, at 770.
156. Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
157. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 5 (1953).
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Kafkaism."' 58  After all, "[t]he adversarial system is central to the
American notion of due process."'' 59 The author emphasized that "'[o]ur
system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the merits
of cases in civil litigation."", 160  Since an upholding of the state secrets
privilege may lead to outright dismissal, 161 it may seem the functional
equivalent of such an ex parte merits decision from the perspective of a
plaintiff.
Such a departure from the traditional adversarial system is a
recognition of the uniquely sensitive nature of state secrets; it
acknowledges that, where it is appropriate, the privilege should wield
considerable force. It takes seriously the executive's constitutional duty to
protect the nation from threats, 162 seeking only to prevent abdication of
judicial control over the case to the caprice of executive officers. 1
63
V. Conclusion
The state secrets privilege, in its current form, poses a threat to "the
very essence of civil liberty."' 64 Too often, cases are improperly dismissed
before the merits; too often, courts take the government at its word.
Fortunately, to remedy these problems, courts need only be more cautious
in applying the privilege. A more precise reading of Reynolds' "very
subject matter" language would prevent premature dismissal of litigation
and the attendant due process concerns. And the mere recognition that ex
parte in camera review is a viable option would prevent executive abuse of
the privilege. The problems associated with the state secrets privilege are
serious, but the tools needed to solve them are well at hand. All that is
required is a careful reading of precedent, a cautious approach, and a
certain amount of judicial courage.
158. Askin, supra note 148, at 746.
159. Askin, supra note 148, at 754.
160. Id. at 756 (quoting Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
161. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
162. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
163. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
164. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
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